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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
acceptance because of a breach of the sales contract, he must give the seller
notice of the defect within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered the breach. By reason of Section 2-608(2) the buyer must also
give the seller notice of his revocation within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered the defect under Section 2-608(2). Notice
of revocation of acceptance under Section 2-608(2) must also be given before
there is any substantial change in the condition of the goods not due to
defects attributable to the seller.
R.W.D.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the insrtument
(a) for value ; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
ANNOTATION
NORMAN V. WORLD WIDE DISTRIB., INC.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
Plaintiff purchased a breakfront from defendant World Wide with the
added inducement of a referral plan under which plaintiff would be paid five
dollars for each letter he wrote to a friend requesting an appointment with
a salesman of World Wide. The plaintiff signed a purchase agreement and an
attached judgment note in blank. Under the terms of the purchase agreement,
the plaintiff agreed to sign the attached note providing for thirty equal
monthly installments totaling $1,079.40, with the first payment due in forty-
five days. The defendant later inserted in the note the correct amount of
$1,079.40 but it was made payable in three days to "State Wide Products".
Three days later the note was purchased for $831 by Peoples, which, during
the prior year, had purchased similar notes from this company under three
different corporate names. Peoples called the plaintiff to inquire into his
satisfaction with the transaction and to indicate that Peoples in no way bad
anything to do with the referral plan. Plaintiff did not complain about the
transaction at this time. Peoples entered judgment on the note against the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was granted relief in equity against World Wide (no
longer in existence) and Peoples; the sales agreement was rescinded on
grounds of fraud and the holder's judgment on the note was declared void.
Upon appeal, the court affirmed, dismissing Peoples' contention that it
was a holder in due course and should collect on the note despite payee's
fraud. It held that under Pennsylvania case law, since the plaintiff had
entered a defense of fraud against the payee, the holder of the note has the
burden of establishing its claim as a holder in due course, and that Peoples
was not a holder in due course since it did not act in good faith as required
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by Sections 1-201(19) and 3-302(1). It asserted that good faith under the
circumstances of this case required the holder to make inquiry into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the note.
COMMENT
Section 3-307(3) supports the court's determination that Peoples had
the burden of establishing itself as a holder in due course. That section pro-
vides that once a defense is shown, the burden then falls upon the party
claiming as a holder in due course to so prove himself.
Section 2-302(1) was correctly cited to determine whether Peoples met
the requirements of a holder in due course. The court refused Peoples the
status of a holder in due course due to its apparent lack of good faith, a
criterion required by Section 3-302. "Good faith" is defined by Section 1-201
(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction." The court compli-
mented this definition with Pennsylvania case law which declares a person
not to be a holder in due course upon "the failure to make inquiry [arising]
... from a suspicion that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect in the
title ...." By reading the Code's provisions for good faith in conjunction with
equitable doctrines provided in its case law, the court has raised problems
which it could have avoided.
The court should simply have held that Peoples had notice of the
maker's defense to the note which precluded it from being a holder in due
course under Section 3-302(1)(c). To determine that Peoples had notice, the
court would have relied on Section 3-304(1) (b), and in light of the notice
definition in Section 1-201(25) (c), it could easily have determined that from
all the circumstances Peoples had reason to know of the maker's defense
against the payee.
By the position assumed by the court in the instant case, purchasers of
commercial paper in Pennsylvania will now be faced, as they were prior to
the Code, with the vague problem of what constitutes circumstances of
suspicion requiring their inquiry in order to act in good faith and what will
satisfy this inquiry. This court demanded inquiry beyond conversation be-
tween the holder and the maker during which no complaints to the transac-
tion had been made. The uncertainty generated by this decision as to the
status of holders of instruments was intended to have been removed by
Article 3. T.H.T.
SECTION 3-304. Notice to Purchaser
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence
of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an
ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
NORMAN V. WORLD WIDE DISTRIB., INC.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-302(1), supra.
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SECTION 3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the in-
strument free from
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(c) such misrepresentations as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
ANNOTATION
*MOORS v. SOUTHERN DISCOUNT CO.
— Ga. App. —, 132 S.E.2d 201 (1963)
An admitted holder in due course of a note sued the maker who set up the
defense of fraud in the procurement. The maker alleged that the payee had
substituted a note for $433.92 by trickery in place of a note for $250 which
the maker had intended to sign. Plaintiff's motion for judgment N.O.V. was
granted after the jury returned a verdict for the maker.
On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that under a Georgia statute as
construed in Georgia cases, fraud in the procurement was a valid defense for
a maker against a holder in due course only if the present holder participated
in the fraud. Since the plaintiff in this action was a holder in due course and
did not perpetrate the fraud, the maker's defense was invalid. The court
intimated that it did not agree with the statute as it had been construed, but
that any change would have to come from the legislature. The court added,
though it did not hold, that apparently the Code, Section 3-305(2), would
not change this statutory rule, had it been in effect.
COMMENT
Fraud as a defense by a maker against a holder in due course in an
action on a note at common law was divided into distinct types. As such,
there was a confusion as to which type constituted a valid defense for a maker
against a holder in due course. This confusion is eliminated by Section 3-305
which sets out the defenses available against a holder in due course. Official
Comment 7 following Section 3-305 states that this section is intended to
cover all situations which meet the requirements regardless of the type of
fraud. The result of the proper application of this section is, contrary to the
dicta of the court in the instant case, to allow the defenses provided therein
to a maker against a holder in due course regardless of the label the alleged
fraud had been assigned under prior law. Based on the reported facts, the
defense under 3-305(2)(c) would have been available to the maker in this
case.
R.W.D.
* Code constructed but did not govern the case.
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CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
PITTSBURGH NAT'L BANK V. KEMILWORTH RESTAURANT CO.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 919 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-403, infra.
SECTION 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures,
Defenses and Due Course
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the
rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or
some person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
NORMAN V. WORLD WIDE DISTRIB., INC.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-302(1), supra.
SECTION 3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an in-
strument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows that the representative signed
in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate par-
ties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the per-
son represented but does not show that the representative
signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does
not name the person represented but does show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity.
ANNOTATION
PITTSBURGH NAT'L BANK V. KEMILWORTH RESTAURANT CO.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 919 (1963)
Laura Dasey, the secretary of the defendant company, signed a judgment
note in the following manner: "Kemilworth Restaurant Co., Inc. [and under
this designation] Homer H. Dasey (seal), Laura W. Dasey (seal)." The
assignee of the payee obtained a judgment by confession against Mrs. Dasey
and subsequently reassigned the note to the payee. In an action to have the
judgment opened, Mrs. Dasey alleged in her pleadings that she had signed
the note in a representative capacity only and by mistake this fact had been
omitted from the terms of the note. The payee, in its pleadings, contended
that since Mrs. Dasey had signed individually, she was liable and that her
representative signature had been inadvertently omitted. From an order
opening the judgment, the payee appealed.
In affirming, the court held that Mrs. Dasey had a valid defense under
Section 3-403(2) (b). The court decided that although the note did not
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show that she had signed in a representative capacity, considering the plead-
ings of both parties together, the contrary was established between the
parties.
COMMENT
Section 3-403(2) of the 1953 Official Version of the Code did not allow
the maker of a note the use of parol evidence to prove the capacity in which
he had signed a note. The 1958 and 1962 Official Versions removed this
prohibition and allows such proof.
It should be noted that had the plaintiff not been the payee, but rather
a holder in due course, Mrs. Dasey would not have prevailed since the de-
fense of her signing in a representative capacity would not have been
available under Section 3-305.
R.W.D.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report
Unauthorized Signature or Alteration
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer: or
the bank a customer who does not within one year from the time the state-
ment and items are made available to the customer (subsection (1)) dis-
cover and report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face
or back of the item or does not within three years from that time discover
and report any unauthorized indorsement is precluded from asserting
against the bank such unauthorized signature or indorsement or such
alteration.
ANNOTATION
*INDEMNITY INS. CO . OF NORTH AMERICA V. FULTON NAT'L BANK
— Ga. App. —, 133 S.E.2d 43 (1963)
Defendant banks paid checks of drawer, plaintiff's assignor, bearing
forged indorsements. Approximately two months after the last check bearing
a forgery was paid, the drawer notified the banks that there were "some ir-
regularities" concerning the genuineness of indorsements of checks in their
accounts. One year and a half after the last forged checks had been cashed,
the drawer sent a detailed notice to the banks together with photostats of
the checks with forged indorsements. In affirming the lower court's sustaining
of the banks' demurrer, the court held that the first notice was not sufficient
since the identity and circumstances of payments were not given. The last
notice was sufficient but it was not given within the one year limitation pro-
vided by statute and therefore ineffective. The court added in a footnote
that the applicable but not then effective UCC Section 4-406(4) modifies
* Code constructed but did not govern the case.
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